This paper shows that up-front payments can play a crucial role in providing efficient investment incentives when contracts are incomplete. They can eliminate the overinvestment effect identified by Rogerson [1984] and Shaven [1980] when courts use an expectation damnge remedy. This method extends to complex contracting situations if parties combine up-front payments with what we call "Cadillac" contracts (contracts for a veiy high quality or quantity).
Introduction
Up-front payments are common enough. One may wonder, though. why one party to a contract sometimes pays the other before the other performs? This essay identifies a new purpose for this practice: Up-front payments, combined with what we call "Cadillac" contracts, can provide a simple solution to the incomplete contracting problem, a solution that incorporates the traditional remedy of expectation damages with a broad duty to mitigate damages. This solution is remarkably robust, working nor only in the simple contractual settings of Rogerson [1984] and Shavell [1980] , but in settings where the investment decisions are complex, though made by only one party.
Up-front payments are often associated with special orders, custom goods, or other contracts involving specific investments. This is probably no accident. Whenever investments are relationship-specific, the investor risks a 'holdup"-i.e.. he risks losing the returns to his investments in negotiations after the investments are s'ink Adequate protection must somehow be provided, and Williamson [1983] has argued that if courts are an impractical option, then up-front payments serve to protect investment returns against the holdup problem."2 We ask here whether such payments are useful in the polar case when courts ate effective. The initial response of those familiar with law and economics might be "no"-at least for the extreme case where courts can costlessly enforce contracts. After all, Rogerson [1984] and Shavell [1980] showed that enforceable fixed-price contracts not only protect investment returns, but can overprotect them and cause overinvestrnent.
twilhian..son [19831 calls such up-front payments "hostages," and develops a model of "private ordernc in which a hostage is paid to the investor-seller up front. This payment serves to bind the buyer, substituting for an enforceable contract.
2High legal fees can make court an impractical option; alternatively, courts can be ineffective if one party is unreliable and may flee from the court's jurisdiction, or become judgment-proof from insolvency.
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The combination of the expectation damage remedy, the up-front payment, and the high rent is critical to the efficiency of this contract. The up-front payment induces the department to accept the high rent. The high rent, in turn, ensures that the alternativerental value of the office space stays below the rent. Otherwise, the department might not unilaterally move even though moving were efficient: since the department has the right to stay under the lea.se, the landlord would then have to bribe the department to move. The more settled" it is, the larger the bribe would generally be: this means the department would have a (bribe-seeking) incentive to "overrelf on the tease; i.e., to overinvest in the specific investment of settling in. The overinvestment problem would turn out to worsen if the landlord could unilaterally breach, terminating the tenancy and paying the tenant expectation damages.
Such an overinvestment (overreliance) problem from expectation damages has become a textbook result in law and economics. Polinsky [1989, 31, br example. writes: The e.rjctation remedy generally leads to too much reliana btcause it git'es the relying party the value that would have been created by (he reliance incest rnent if the contract had been performed.
Recent work indicates that the overinvestment problem is not so general as was thought when Polinsky wrote this passage. Rogerson (1984] and Shavell (1980] studied indivisible trade-trade either happened or it didn't. In contrast, when the quantity the parties contract to trade is a continuous variable as in the lease example, Edlin and Reichelstein [1993] have now shown that simple fixed-price contracts can induce an efficient level of investment for one party under an expectation damage remedy. (Under specific performance, see also Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey [1994] and Chung 119911.) However, in the Rogerson-Shavell discrete-trade context, the balancing approach of Edlin and Reichelstein [19931 requires random contracts.4 Moreover, these approaches do not create appropriate incentives when the investment problem is multifaceted, as when the economics department above needs to decide its expenditures to speed the remodeling and also to settle into the downtown offices. The intuition behind combining up-front payments and expectation darnage is situpie. The party that makes a sufficiently large up-front payment will not want to breach. since finishing performance requires only a commensurately small subsequent payment.6 Therefore, the other party will commit any breach. Controlling who breaches is critical under an expectation remedy, because the breacher gets the residual left after paying the victim compensatory damages. If the breacher is also the investor he will invest 4ilermalin and Katz 119931 develop a non-random solution for the discrete context; their fill-in-theprice contract is elegant, but is-somewhat more complex than a fixed-price contract and requires that renegotiation be ruled out in the 'syinznetric information" cases considered here. (For general abstract mechanisms see Rogerson (19921;  for the use of liquidated damages see MacLeod and Malcomson (1993] or Spier and Whinston [1994J.) Cooter and Eisenberg (19851 argue that overreliance will not occur if expectation damages protect only the expectancy conditional upon efficient (or reasonable) investment. Spin and Whinston (19941 make the same argument.
lznplicit in this comment is the assumption that the breaching party cannot sue. This assumption is central and the paper will provide examples where it holds and where it doent. Where it doesn't, policy conclusions tollow. efficiently, maximizing this residual.
In Rogerson [1984] and Shavell's (1980] models, breach is committed by the party with the uncertain valuation of trade. If the breacher is not the investor, overinvestment results for the reason Polinsky described.7 In contrast, when the investor breaches, he invests efficiently, just as in the "second case" in Shavell [1980, 484-Si] , where the investor has the uncertain valuation and so is the party to breach. Section 2 simply observes that upfront payments allow the parties to control who breaches, so that the overinvestment effect from expectation damages is not mandated by the potentially exogenous arrangement of who must invest and who experiences uncertainty. The parties control their fate, and can avoid overinvestment by choosing an appropriate contract.8 Section 3 explains that the court does not have to observe damages for the approach in Section 2 to provide efficient investment incentives; the court need only make an unbiased damage judgment. Section 4 shows that this approach works in quite general settings where both parties' valuations are uncertain, and where one party makes multidimensional choices about investment and trade. Allocating all "decision rights" both cc ante and ex post to one party is important, and to do this, we argue that the law (or perhaps the parties) should incorporate a broad duty to mitigate damages. a duty that includes accepting non-conforming performance. When the investor cannot be given a decision right over production, a good substitute is for the contract to be "divisible," which allows the investor to breach one part of the contract without discharging the other party's duty to perform other parts of the contract. It is also important to the approach we outline to avoid situations with holdups where both parties must come to an agreement in order to trade aciently. The parties may do so by signing a "Cadil-'See Shavell's 11980, pp. 473-83j first case and also Itogerson 119841.
'Contrast this viewpoint with Shavell (1980, 4731, who did not consider up-front payments being made to the investor, and who therefore described the situation in his "fiat case" as follows: 'tiotice here that the party who chooses reliance does not face uncertainty in a direct way and that the other party does. This means that the party who decides about reliance is not the one who decides about breach." Page 6
lac" contract-a contract to trade as high a quantity and quality as they are likely to want. Such a contract ensures that all adjustments of trade are "downward," and can be achieved with unilateral breach. Hence, Cadillac contracts and either divisibility or a broad duty to mitigate damages combine to extend the results in Section 2 to quite general contexts.
It should not he too surprising that efficient contracts exist, even in the genera! contexts of in Section 4. After all, the first-best should be attainable if one party is risk-neutral and can feasibly make all decisions. Compare the situation to a standard principal-agent framework where the solution would be to have the agent buy the firm.
The solution presented here is interesting for at least three reasons. First it is liistorical: it shows that earlier overinvestment results stemmed from restrictions on the foriti of contract. Second, it illustrates how fixed-price contracts can interact with legal doctrines such as expectation damages, a broad duty to mitigate damages, and contractual divisibility, to effectively give all decision rights and the residual to one party. This suggests a variety of guiding principles for parties writing contracts or for courts constructing problem-solving default rules. Third, it incorporates up-front payments made to the party that undertakes investment, a common phenomenon that differs from the investor buying out the other party. (Our agent, instead of buying out the firm, is paid a significant up-front sum in return for promising to deliver the maximum output.)
The paper has four remaining sections. Section 2 explains the importance of up- Otherwise it is better to sell the investment as salvage for a(s). We assume some optimal investment level or levels exist. Since both buyer and seller are risk-neutral, any first-best level of investment satisfies 8 e argmaxf ma4v(O) -c(S),(S)1dF-5, ç2) where F (0) is the cumulative distribution for contingencies 8. The Liming of events is summarized below.
91n Rogerson (1984] and Shavell [1980] the buyer invests and the seller has uncertain costs. This difference is unimportant here. However, when trade is not discrete, as in Section 4, it becomes important.
There we explicitly present a solution method involving a broad duty to mitigate damages. On the other hand, if the buyer invests, & parallel analysis would involve the contract being TMdivisible," a concept we elaborate later. 
Efficient investment from up-frént payments
We show below that when an up-front payment is possible, the parties can sign a fixedprice contract that provides optimal investment incentives. The parties should sign such a contract since it maximizes joint surplus, and this surplus can be divided arbitrarily with the up-front payment.
We begin by defining up-front payments.
Definition 1. An up-front payment is anything valuable delivered at the time a contract is signed (other than the promise of payment for the goods). It might represent money paid, another profitable trade, or the signing of a separate profitable agreement.
We consider a fixed-price contract to trade the good at a price p to be paid at the time of trade. The buyer also pays the seller an amount T up front, which may be viewed as compensation for the seller's investment. This up-front payment plays a critical role in creating efficient investment incentives.
We assume that if either the seller or the buyer breaches the contract, the other party may choose to sue to get an expectation damage remedy imposed. In contrast, the breaching party cannot sue on a "breach of contract" theory since the other party has breached no contractual duty. We also assume that the breaching party cannot sue in what is called "quasi-contract," and that the court will find no other reason to assist the breaching party.'° This latter assumption does not accurately reflect the legal system in some jurisdictions and cases. For instance, the doctrine that a "willful" contract breacher cannot sue is common but not universal." Where the assumption does not presently apply, our analysis will generate a legal policy recommendation as well as a contracting recommendation. The policy recommendation is that courts should become increasingly skeptical of such suits in quasi-contract; but until they do, the contracting prescription is that parties pay the up-front payment in a Separate contract with separate consideration. These prescriptions eliminate a race to breach,'2 and allow the parties to neatly overcome the overinvestment problem by controlling who breaches.
To be concrete about the sort of unjust enrichment suit that will prevent the parties from solving their contracting problem, consider the lease example in the introduction, Suppose that while the economics faculty is attending the Winter AEA meetings, the landlord removes their belongings and re-rents their offices. They can site for breach of contract to recover any damages they suffer, but they may suffer no damages: They '°The poasibility of suing "in quantum meruit," one type of "quasi-contractual" suit, is a longestablished way to recover benefits conferred on another who the court deems would otherwise be unjustly enriched. Even where there is a contract, and bne party has clearly breached the contract, courts have often allowed that party to recover the value of benefits he conferred upon the victim of the breach. (See, e.g.1 Britlon v. Turner [1834] , where the plaintiff breached a twelve-month labor contract by working only nine and one-half months, but was allowed to recover nine and one-halt month's wages.)
However1 courts sometimes refuse to allow such recoveries. See BerL-c 8' Co. v. Griffin, Inc. [1976, 7641 where the court note that, generaIly quantum meruit recovery will not be awarded where the conduct has been 'wilful' [sic] ." ttSee the comment later regarding Berke & Co. it. Griffin, Inc. (1976] . Some commentators argue that even a willful breacher should be accorded relief. See Nordstrom and Woodland [1959, 211-14] .
Ijf quantum meruit recovery is allowed for the breather, extreme perversities may result. Suppose that unjust enrichment means receiving more than one's expectancy resulting from another's breach, and suppose further that a contract breather can always sue to prevent unjust enrichment. Then both buyer and seller will be in a race to breach when tiade is inefficient. Each will attempt to make announcements of his refusal to perform in advance of the other's announcements. More peculiar still, each wilt assert in court that the announcement of the other did not amount to an anticipatory repudiation or breach! These Alice-in-Wonderland phenomena occur if the breacher can always "pin" the other party to his expectancy by suing for disgorgement of any surplus from not trading when that is efficient.
Page 10 may find other accommodations for less rent and not be much inconvenienced. Would the landlord, then, be able to sue them to recover the rent for the two free months they enjoyS at the beginning of their lease, or for their rental savings from their involuntary relocation? Were they "unjustly enriched"? In this paper, we assume the answer is no
The landlord who breached has no cause of action. This assumption is probably realistic in this example, however, in other examples where the structure of the contract and flavor of the breach differs, some jurisdictions will allow the breacher to sue. This paper provides reasons not to. We will return to these issues later.
Since we follow Rogerson [1984) and Shavell [1980] in ignoring litigation costs, a breach victim will sue whenever damages are positive. Although abstracting from litigation cost necessarily limits the descriptive power of this paper, it allows us to further develop the influential benchmark case they considered. For now, we assume that the court has sufficient information to properly calculate damages. As Shavell [19S0J emphasizes. this requires the court to observe the value v(9), but not the state 0 nor the functional relationship v (.). Section 3 of this paper considers imperfectly informed courts that can't observe even u.
Damages will be calculated using the expectation formula; this formula compensates for economic damages, and is defined as follows:
Definition 2. Expectation damages are the amount that makes the victim of a breach exactly as well off as she would have been if the other party had performed.
Expectation damages give the victim what lawyers call her "expectancy." Accordingly, if the seller breaches, he will have to pay the buyer
If the buyer's damages v(O)-p are positive, the buyer gets the same payoff as perfonnance.
She can bring an action to recover t'(O) -p, or equivalently, since they anticipate the 
assuming that the buyer notifies the seller of the breach before he incurs the variable costs c(S). Again the "max" takes into account the fact that no one forces the seller to sue. The seller's expectancy is p -c(S), but i(S) is deducted because the seller is obligated to "mitigate" his damages by selling the investment at its salvage value,'31'
Although the duty to mitigate damages can induce efficient actions ex post, this feature is inconsequential in a symmetric information context where renegotiation is possible.
The duty to mitigate damages is nonetheless quite important for efficient investment incentives, and Section 4 explains that in a more general setting, the duty to mitigate damages should be broader than the law often recognizes.
When contractual quantity is not an available instrument, the key to inducing efficient investment is to set the price low so that the seller-investor commits any breach.
(Compare with Edlin and Reichelstein (1993] , where quantity is used as an instrument.) Proposition 1. Let p E infu(9). Then the seller invests and breaches efficiently, flowever, unless trade is always efficient, the seller must be paid an up-front payment, or he will not agree to such a low price.
13[f the buyer wants to breach, she should announce her intention early, repudiating the contract. Otherwise her damage payment might increase by c(S) (if the seller produced) or even c(S) + a(S) (if the seller produced and lost his opportunity to salvage his investment).
"The duty to mitigate generally bars a plaintiff from recovering costs incurred after cancellation of the contract. A canonical example l found in Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co. [1929) ,where Luten Bridge Co. continued building a bridge after notice of cancellation was given by Rockingham County. Rockingharn successfully argued that it owed Luten only the "damages which the company would have sustained, if it had abandoned construction at that time." Note, however, that some expenses incurred after cancellation are recoverable. For Instance, advertising expenses are generally recoverable when they might reasonably increase salvage value; in a typical view, such expenses are recoverable even "where the result is an aggravation of the damages rather than a mitigation1" if "expenses are the result of a prudent attempt to mininte damages." (Air. Eddie, inc. a. Ginsberg [1968) , a breach of contract case, where a wrongfully dismissed employee under a three-year employment contract spent $1,340 in an unsuccessful job search.) Proof: Suppose the buyer does not breach, but stands ready, willing, and able to buy. Proposition 2. Suppose the buyer invests, and let the valuations be u(S) and c(9).
Then if p supc(O), the buyer invests and breaches efficiently.
Proof: The proof is left to the reader, since it is essentially the same as when the seller jnvests.O Our anumption that the contract breather cannot sue may at times appear punitive to the breather. For instance, if the buyer invests and the seller fails to deliver, the buyer keeps any up-front payment. Possibly, the buyer gets more than her expectancy out of the deal. We previously pointed out that in cases such as our lease example, it is realistic to think that the party who made the up-front payment has no recourse if she breaches.
Another example is a record club whose membership consists of an initial enrollment purchase of twelve records for one cent together with the promise to pay a high price for some number of additional records at a later date. If the club later refused to sell the additional records (even at the high price), it is doubtful that the initial discounted sale would be voided, or that the buyer would owe additional money.
On the other hand, suppose a buyer puts down a deposit on a couch. only to cancel her purchase subsequently. If the deposit is unreasonably large "in light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining adequate remedy," a court may insist that some of it be returned under the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-718. Yet, suppose the couch were custom-made and that the maker had to order special fabrics and foams with lovi resale value, In consideration of this specific investment, the customer makes what we call an up-front payment; or, perhaps she simply buys the materials from the maker, and a separate contract is written to build the couch, so that if the buyer cancels the construction (breaching), she should be entitled to no refund on her purchase of materials (or payment for investment). When the buyer is seen to be purchasing the investment in a separate deal, the up-front payment will not be refundable to a breaching buyer unless the investment were not made. If the up-front payment were made in a separate agreement. the penalty doctrine might not apply across the agreements.
Again, we remind the reader that the above analysis is valuable even in those cases or jurisdictions where the breacher could sue. Then, the analysis provides a policy reason why a breacher should not be able to sue. Allowing an up-front payment to stand even when it appears punitive lends the parties considerable contracting power. Notice.
though, that efficiency is not driven simply by allowing what in some cases is tantamount to high stipulated damages; rather, efficiency results from the combination of these "high damages" preventing one party from breaching, and the expectation remedy giving the other party appropriate breach and investment incentives. investor-seller, he will not agree to the low price that drives Proposition 1; instead, lie will demand a price p such that (7) where . is whatever investment the seller chooses given the contract. (If the inequality were violated, the seller would always lose money.) With such a "high' price, as we shall see, the seller always performs and the buyer becomes the potential breacher.
No up-front payrnints: Overinvestment
In order to derive the Rogerson-Shavell overinvestment effect, we must impose additional structure on the model:
(A2) 5 as defined by (2) is unique and 3 (0,3);
Je:v(D)-cs•)ca(s•)
Assumption (Al states that marginal investment lowers production costs by more than it increases salvage value.'7 Assumption (A2) is self-explanatory and (A3) states thai when S = S., salvage is efficient with positive probability. These assumptions abo;.it.
functional form and the uniqueness of 5 were unnecessary to prove Proposition I, but we need them here to replicate the traditional overinvestment result. Proof: As argued above, when up-front payments are impossible. the seller will only agree to a price p such that p -c(S) a(S), when evaluated at the investment level
This assumption corresponds to assumption 3 in Rogerson [1984] except that he wrote it as a weak inequality, and proved weak overinvestment. This leaves the decision to breach in the hands of the investor. Under an expectation remedy, a combined breacher-investor gets the full residual surplus a post, and so has the incentives a ante to invest to maximize this surplus. This principle applies to far more general contexts than the Rogerson-Shavell model, as shown by the following two sections.
Imperfectly Informed Courts
This brief section demonstrates that the analysis of Section 2 is essentially unchanged when courts do not observe the true damages. What is critical is that the courts impose an unbiased measure of damages. This point, which is made in , has proved sufficiently provocative to warrant further elaboration.
Suppose that when true damages are D, the court observes and imposes D, where (11) and c represents the court's error or misperception. Assume that the parties cannot anticipate the direction of the courts bias (i.e., the expected value of Th is D).
Since we are ignoring litigation costs, if the seller breaches, the risk-neutral buyer will still bring a case whenever the true damages D are positive. Given the low trading price (The plaintiffs were unable to take possession because the defendant subsequently leased the space to a third party.)
General Settings and a Broad Duty to Mitigate
The principles developed in Section 2.2 are quite general, as this section reveals. This generality gives the expectation remedy significant advantages over specific performance in one-sided investment problems. To realize these advantages, a broad duty to mitigate damages is a useful supplement to an expectation remedy when the seller invests. When the buyer invests, a divisible contract is correspondingly useful.
Consider a more general setting where the seller may supply many goods and services to the buyer, perhaps at different times and in different quantities or qualities. Let q represent a list of the goods and services delivered, chosen from some set Q. Let v(q, 0) represent the value to the buyer of q in contingency 9.
(Ri) Assume Q has a maximal element with non-negative value: i.e., In this section, we assume the seller can buy m assets, denoted by S e R, which may affect the cost of performing q. (Each of the nt assets may vary in scale or quality since each is associated with a real number.) The assets cost I(S) , where I R' ' R Let the cx post cost of producing q be c(S,q,9). The costs c represent the most economical method of producing q with S given 9. In some contingencies, this may involve selling as salvage some of the assets embodied in S; in others, all of S may be fully used in production. It is worthwhile keeping in mind that the function c is a reduced form, which may capture sophisticated deployment decisions)8
Suppose the parties have written a Cadillac contract to "trad&' with the entire an example, let A E 20 m) represent the indices of the assets put to alternative use. (A can be any subset of {1 m}.) Then the assets in alternative use can be represented as LEA where is the jUt element of S and e is the ith unit vector (0 1,..., 0). The value derived from the assets put to alternative use is a(EIEA Seb9) . Suppose further that the costs of production of q using the assets not in A i (LA Sej, q, 9). Then, we would have c(S, q,9) a -max [ä(E,EA Sej, 9)-
Page 21 payment T made up front, so that no payment is required when is performed.1° Consider the situation after the investment S is made and contingency U realized. What will the seller supply? If the seller supplies q , the buyer can accept or reject the tender.
Regardless, the buyer will sue because by (BI), v(.9) v(q,O), so the buyer suffers non-negative damages.2° If the buyer accepts q, her damages are D=v(.9)-v(q,9). Vithout a broad duty to mitigate, the breach victim may secure more than the benefit of her bargain by threatening to refuse q unless the seller agrees to pay larger damages.
This duty to mitigate is broader than often obtains. For instance, in Parker u. Twentieth
Century-Fox [1970J, the California Supreme Court held that Shirley MacLame Parker did not need to accept Twentieth Century's offer to star in a western titled "Big Country,
Big Man" to mitigate damages for Twentieth Century1s breach of the contract in which she was to star in a musical titled "Bloomer Girl." Also, in the context of the sale of goods, under the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-601, the buyer has the right to "reject the whole" if "the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform '91t is possible to have some payments made at performance, but that requires a detailed discussion of the importance of a divisible contract.
20We assume that the non-conforming performance q call be accepted without compromising the buyer's rights to her expectancy. Page 22 to the contract.'21 Moreover, under Section 2-711 a "rightful" rejection by the buyer leaves her with the same remedies as lithe seller had not performed at all. Nonetheless, while a broad duty to mitigate may not presently obtain, the next proposition indicates it would have some advantages.
Proposition 5. A Cadillac contract to supply for an up-front payment T leads to efficient investment and breach when an expectation damage measure is applied and the buyer has a broad duty to mitigate damages.
Proof: Joint surplus is maximized by solving the fOllowing iterative program: Ex post, given assets S, and the realized contingency 0, choose q to solve Z(S,9) rnaxv(q,9) -c(S,q,9) .
(16)
Ex ante, joint surplus is maximized by choosing S to solve mg.xEEZ(S,Ofl-I(S) (17) where E denotes the expectation operator.
Under a Cadillac contract, with payment T made entirely up front, the seller solves a nearly identical problem. Suppose the seller delivers q 4. Given the broad duty to mitigate damages, the buyer's rights will be limited to damages of v(4, 0) -v(q, 0) regardless of whether he rejects or accepts q. Since the contract is a Cadillac contract, v(4, 9)-v(q, 0) 0, so the buyer will, in fact, demand, and if necessary sue for, payment of v(4, 9) -v(q, 0). Therefcre, given S and 0, the seller chooses q ex post to solve W(S,O)=rIaQx-D(q,9)_c(S,q,9) , (18) where damages D(q,9) = v(q,9)
31/is other sections in the Uniform Commercial Code make clear these rights of rejection should not be read overly broadly, but they do apply to non-conformities that go to "the heart of the agreement." The expectation damage remedy allows us to find a contract that leads to efficient choice of assets; efficient use of assets, and efficient performance or breach. Compare this with specific performance. Under a specific performance remedy, when the investment decision is a one-dimensional decision, fixed-price contracts can be efficient. These results require a continuous contractible variable q and a number of assumptions about how investment affects valuations (see Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey [1994] , ('hung [19911, and Edlin and Reichelstein [19931) . None of these assumptions are needed for the approach above. Moreover, even with those assumptions, the first-best can't be implemented under specific performance when the investment decision is multi-dimensional revealed, for instance, a bias toward investing in overspecialized assets instead of assets with higher values in alternative uses). No such biases exist under an expectation damage remedy with up-front payments and a Cadillac contract. Provided the parties can arrange for one party to make all the cx ante investment expenditures and decisions together with ex-post breach decisions, expectation damages is an ideal remedy.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is as follows. A large up-front payment by the non-investing buyer to the investing seller ensures that the buyer performs the contract.
A broad duty to mitigate damages, including accepting non-conforming performance.
leaves the breach decision unilaterally in the hands of the investor. Otherwise some ln some cases where the buyer invests, a divisible contract is unnecessary. For instance, in our lease example the economics department (the buyer) invests. The department has a property right to stay (or the duration of the tease; moreover, it can move out early without needing any agreement from the landlord (though it would owe damages). Thus the law allocates decision rights over q to the lessee, (at least when q <i), which means no divisible contract is needed.
Page 25
Implications
The central result of this paper is that the expectation damage remedy need not lead to overinvestment in relationship-specific assets. In fact, even in the very general context of Section 4. we found that all decisions were first-best. The conventional wisdom in the law and economics literature about distorted investment resulted from assumptions about which party breached, a fact noted by Shavell [1980] in the simple discrete-trade context of Section 2. Yet. even in that simple context, a major part of the puzzle was left out: If up-front payments to the investor are possible, the party who breaches is not determined exogenously by which party has uncertain valuations, as Shavell (19S0j assumed. Quite the contrary. when such up-front payments are possible, the parties themselves control who will want to breach in low-trade contingencies. When the non-investing party makes a sufficiently large up-front payment, she will want to carry out the contract even if her valuation proves unfavorable-any breach will be made by the investing party. This arrangement provides efficient investment and breach incentives under the expectation damage formula.
Thus when one party needs to make a specific investment, it is natural that the other should make some payment early. An up-front payment is desirable even when neither party will flee or become bankrupt and the legal system costlessly enforces contracts.
The payment determines who wants to breach, which is critical under an expectation damage remedy.
From this analysis we learn a number of lessons about policy. Notice first that we assumed that the breaching party could not successfully sue. This prevented the "race to breach discussed in Section 2, allowing the parties to control who breached. This argues that courts should be skeptical of unjust enrichment claims, or at least honor contracts that give up the right to sue for unjust enrichment. Similarly, we provide another reason why courts should not invoke the penalty doctrine to return deposits.
Another lesson is that the courts should take a broader view of the duty to mitigateor at least stand ready to take a broad view if requested in the contract. Such a view of mitigation was critical to the efficiency of Cadillac contracts in Section 4. Correspondingly, when the buyer is the investor, the critical issue becomes the divisibility of the contract.
A third lesson is that specific performance is not always the best remedy when specific investments are involved. Edlin and Reichelstein [1993] argued that specific performance is superior when both parties make investments (but wheie the investments were simplistic). Vet when the investment and breach decisions can all be allocated to one party, the expectation remedy is superior because multi-faceted investment can be efficient. Therefore, when parties neglect to specify a remedy, as they often do, expectation damages is a good default rule in one-sided investment problems. Its application implies that the ex ante incentives of the contract breacher were appropriate (at least the incentives arising from the given contingency). These first-best incentives may very vell be gotten at the expense of incentives for the victim of breach (see Edlin and Reichelstein [1993] ), but this will not matter if the victim does not make substantial reliance decisions.
The victim of breach may seek specific performance, because she may use the threat of forcing inefficient performance to increase her total payoff. The courts, however, should be loathe to grant it unless she can show some reliance or specific investment of her own. This proposal might be viewed as giving a new interpretation to the rule that specific performance is only granted when the "legal remedy" of damages are "inadequate." The inadequacy of damages is traditionally viewed as meaning that damages are difficult to measure, such as with unique chattel. Section 3, however, showed that difficulty of measurement per se is not particularly important. The model indicates that the victim of breach should have to show that the remedy is "inadequate" because it does not provide Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: by A.S. Edlln Page 27 partks in her position with appropriate incentives ex ante. Expectation damages would not provide appropriate incentives to the victim of breach (see Rogerson 11984], Shavell [1980] , and Edlin and R.eicbelstein 11993J). When the breach victim also must invest, then, specific performance is better as it provides more balanced incentives (see Edlin and Reicheistein (1993) ).
Finally, we should ponder the implications of Section 3, which explained that the accuracy of the expectation measure is not so important as its unbiasedness. This suggests that it is worthwhile to consider the efficacy of certain legal rules that tend to bias damages. One such rule is the rule that damages must be "certain".
Before closing, it is worth recalling some assumptions that warrant examination in future work. In particular, we have stuck to the Rogerson 11984] and Shavell [1980) assumption that courts are costless. This allows a better understanding oftheir work, h, relaxing the assumption would clearly be worthwhile to gain a more accurate descripi theory. Relaxing the risk-neutrality assumption would also be a valuable exercise.
